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Abstract
This work is a contribution on the problem of the existence of Berge equilibrium. Abalo and Kostreva give an existence theorem
for this equilibrium that appears in the papers [K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Berge equilibrium: Some recent results from fixed-
point theorems, Appl. Math. Comput. 169 (2005) 624–638; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Some existence theorems of Nash and
Berge equilibria, Appl. Math. Lett. 17 (2004) 569–573]. We found that the assumptions of these theorems are not sufficient for
the existence of Berge equilibrium. Indeed, we construct a game that verifies Abalo and Kostreva’s assumptions, but has no Berge
equilibrium. Then we provide a condition that overcomes the problem in these theorems. Our conclusion is also valid for Radjef’s
theorem, which is the basic reference for [K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Berge equilibrium: Some recent results from fixed-point
theorems, Appl. Math. Comput. 169 (2005) 624–638; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge
equilibria, Appl. Math. Lett. 17 (2004) 569–573; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Fixed points, Nash games and their organizations,
Topol. Methods Nonlinear Anal. 8 (1996) 205–215; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Equi-well-posed games, J. Optim. Theory Appl.
89 (1996) 89–99].
c© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
On the basis of the notion of equilibrium for a coalition R with respect to a coalition S introduced by Berge in
1957 [5], Zhukovskii introduced the Berge equilibrium [8]. This equilibrium can be used as an alternative solution
when there is no Nash equilibrium [6] or when there are many. In this equilibrium each player obtains his/her
maximum payoff if the situation is favorable for him/her: by obligation or willingness, the other players choose
strategies favorable for him/her.
In [1–4] Abalo and Kostreva give a more general definition of Berge equilibrium. They also provide a theorem
for the existence of this equilibrium as Theorems 2, 3 in the paper [1] and Theorems 3.1, 3.2 in the paper [2]. It is
to be noted that this theorem is based on an earlier theorem of Radjef [7] providing an existence theorem of Berge
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equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii [8]. After a deep investigation, we have found that the assumptions given in
the Abalo and Kostreva theorem are not sufficient for the existence of Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii.
The same remark can be made for Radjef’s theorem. Indeed, we provide a simple game that verifies the assumptions
of Abalo and Kostreva’s theorem without Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii, which is a particular case of
Berge equilibrium in the sense of Abalo and Kostreva. Further, we provide a condition that overcomes the problem
pointed out.
The work is organized as follows. We first present the Berge equilibrium both in the sense of Abalo and Kostreva
and in the sense of Zhukovskii. Then, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the Berge
equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii. Next, we provide an example of a game that verifies the assumptions of Abalo
and Kostreva’s theorem without Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii. We end the work with an analysis
showing why these assumptions are not sufficient and giving the necessary corrections.
Consider the following noncooperative game in normal form:
G = (X i , fi )i∈I , (1.1)
where I is the set of players, and we assume that it is finite or infinite countable, X = ∏i∈I X i is the set of issues of
the game, where X i is the set of strategies of player i ; X i ⊂ Ei , Ei is a vector space and fi : X −→ R is the payoff
function of player i .
For any player i , we denote by I − i the set I − {i}. We also define X̂ = ∏k∈I X I−k , where X I−k = ∏ j∈I−k X j
is the set of strategy profiles of the players in the coalition I − k, ∀k ∈ I .
Abalo and Kostreva [1–4] give the following definition.
Definition 1.1. Consider a game (1.1). Let R = {Rt }t∈M be a partition of I and S = {St }t∈M be a set of subsets of
I . A feasible strategy x ∈ X is an equilibrium point for the set R relative to the set S or simply a Berge equilibrium
point for game (1.1) if
frm (x) ≥ frm (xSm , x I−Sm ),
for each given m ∈ M , any rm ∈ Rm and xSm ∈ XSm .
Let M = I ; consider Ri = {i}, for any i ∈ I . It is obvious that the family R = {Ri }i∈I is a partition of the set of
players I , and let Si = I − i , for all i ∈ I . In this case the Definition 1.1 reduces to the following definition of Berge
equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii [8].
Definition 1.2. A feasible strategy x ∈ X is a simple Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii for game (1.1) if
fi (x) ≥ fi (x I−i , x i ), (1.2)
for each given i ∈ I and x I−i ∈ X I−i .
This definition means that when a player i ∈ I plays his/her strategy x i from the Berge equilibrium x , he/she
cannot obtain a maximum payoff unless the remaining players I − i willingly (or are obliged to) play the strategy
x I−i from the Berge equilibrium x . In other words, if at least one of the players of coalition I − i deviates from his/her
equilibrium strategy, the payoff of the player i in the resulting strategy profile would be at most equal to his/her payoff
fi (x) in Berge equilibrium.
The Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii is rarely mentioned (not to say used) by game theorists. One of
the most important reasons for this is that Zhukovskii published his results in Russian and within the former USSR
with local publishers only, so his results are not known worldwide. The first paper published outside the former USSR
is [7]. The first papers published on Berge equilibrium in well established international journals are [1–4]. As we
mentioned above, there are two main reasons that motivated Zhukovskii to introduce the Berge equilibrium as an
alternative solution to Nash equilibrium [8]. The first one is the absence of a concept of solution (in pure strategies)
for games where there is no Nash equilibrium; the second one is the difficulty of choosing a Nash equilibrium in games
where there is more than one Nash equilibrium. The Berge equilibrium can be used to study numerous non-cooperative
models, more particularly coalition games. Furthermore, in contrast to the Nash equilibrium, this concept allows one to
reach cooperative issues. Indeed, with this equilibrium it is not necessary to introduce behavioral assumptions to obtain
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cooperative issues; consequently, it becomes possible to determine cooperation in a non-cooperative framework. This
property is very important for games like the prisoner’s dilemma.
Let us give an example of a conflict situation where Berge equilibrium is the solution to which players will
converge.
Example 1.1. Consider the game illustrated by the following table.
A B
A (−1.40, 0.94) (−0.99, 0.93)
B (−1.01, 0.98) (−1, 1)
where there are two players I and II, and each has available two strategies. We list I’s strategies as rows in the table, and
II’s strategies as columns. This game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the strategy profile
(B, B) is a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii. The strategy A is attractive for player I because he/she may
get his/her best payoff in the game, i.e−0.99, but in the case where player II chooses the strategy A, he/she gets his/her
worst payoff in the game, i.e. −1.40. In addition, strategy B is his/her maxmin strategy. Indeed, the minimum he/she
gets by choosing A is −1.40, and by choosing B he/she gets −1.01. Thus, player I will tend to choose the strategy B.
He/she can reach the Berge equilibrium (B, B) in announcing that he/she has chosen the strategy B. Indeed, in this
case player II will automatically choose the strategy B for which he/she will get his/her best payoff in the game, i.e. 1.
2. Sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of the Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii
In this section we derive sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of the Berge equilibrium in the sense
of Zhukovskii when the set of players is finite. For this purpose we use some special functions.
Assumption 2.1. In this approach we assume that the number of players is finite, i.e. I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, the sets
X i , i = 1, . . . , n are compact and the functions fi , i = 1, . . . , n, are continuous on X .
Let us introduce the real valued function φ : X × X̂ → R, defined by
(x, ŷ) 7−→ φ(x, ŷ) =
n∑
i=1
{ fi (xi , ŷI−i )− fi (x)} (2.1)
where x ∈ X, ŷ = (ŷI−1, . . . , ŷI−n) ∈ X̂ =∏ni=1 X I−i .
Remark 2.1. Note that by definition of function (2.1), we have
∀x ∈ X, max
ŷ∈X̂
φ(x, ŷ) ≥ 0. (2.2)
Indeed, let x ∈ X , and ŷ = (x I−1, x I−2, . . . , x I−n) in (2.1); we get φ(x, ŷ) = 0. Consequently, ∀x ∈
X,maxŷ φ(x, ŷ) ≥ 0.
The following lemma shows the relation between the function (2.1) and Berge equilibria of the game (1.1).
Lemma 2.1. The following two propositions are equivalent.
(1) x ∈ X is a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii of the game (1.1).
(2) maxŷ∈X̂ φ(x, ŷ) = 0.
Proof. Let x ∈ X be a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii of the game (1.1). Then
fi (x i , yI−i ) ≤ fi (x), ∀yI−i ∈ X I−i , ∀i ∈ I,
and hence
φ(x, ŷ) =
n∑
i=1
{ fi (x i , yI−i )− fi (x)} ≤ 0, ∀ŷ ∈ X̂ ,
i.e. maxŷ∈X̂ φ(x, ŷ) ≤ 0.
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Taking into account the inequality (2.2), we obtain maxŷ∈X̂ φ(x, ŷ) = 0.
Conversely, let x ∈ X be such that maxŷ maxφ(x, ŷ) = 0; this equality implies
∀ŷ ∈ X̂ ,
n∑
i=1
fi (x i , ŷI−i )− fi (x) ≤ 0.
For some fixed i ∈ I , we have
∀ŷ ∈ X̂ , fi (x i , ŷI−i )− fi (x)+
n∑
j 6=i
j=1
f j (x j , ŷI− j )− f j (x) ≤ 0.
Let us consider ŷ ∈ X̂ such that ŷI−i is arbitrarily chosen in X I−i and ŷI− j = x I− j ,∀ j 6= i ; we get∑n
j 6=i
j=1
f j (x j , ŷI− j )− f j (x) = 0. Then, from the last inequality, we deduce that ∀ŷI−i ∈ X I−i , fi (x i , ŷI−i ) ≤ fi (x).
Since i is arbitrarily chosen in I , we get ∀i ∈ I , ∀yI−i ∈ X I−i , fi (x i , yI−i ) ≤ fi (x). Thus, x is a Berge equilibrium
in the sense of Zhukovskii of the game (1.1). 
Remark 2.2. According to Assumption 2.1, the maximum of the function (2.1) over X̂ exists, for all x ∈ X .
From Lemma 2.1, we deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Let µ = minx∈X maxŷ∈X̂ φ(x, ŷ). Then the game (1.1) has at least one Berge equilibrium in the
sense of Zhukovskii if and only if µ = 0.
Proof. It is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 2.1 and inequality (2.2). 
Remark 2.3. According to (2.2), we always have µ ≥ 0. Then taking Lemma 2.1 into account, we deduce that if
µ > 0 the game (1.1) has no Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii (the system (1.2) has no solution).
3. Theorem of Abalo and Kostreva
In this section we recall the definition of an S-system and the sufficient conditions for the existence of the Berge
equilibrium established by Abalo and Kostreva [1,2].
Let S = {Si }i∈I be a family of nonempty pairwise distinct sets such that I = ⋃i∈I Si . Then S is said to be an
S-system for the game (1.1) if for each i ∈ I , argmaxi (x I−Si ) is nonempty, where
argmax
i
(x I−Si ) = {x Si ∈ XSi : fi (x Si , x I−Si ) = max
ySi ∈XSi
fi (ySi , x I−Si )}.
Abalo and Kostreva [1,2] proved the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let I be an indexed set, finite or infinite, and let {Ei }i∈I be a family of metrizable locally convex
topological vector spaces. Let the set S = {Si }i∈I be an S-system for game (1.1) and for each i ∈ I , let X i be a
nonempty convex and weakly compact subset of Ei such that
(1) fi is continuous on X,
(2) argmaxi (x I−Si ) is a singleton for each x I−Si in X I−Si .
Then, game (1.1) has a Berge equilibrium.
Remark 3.1. It is very important to note that in Theorem 3.1 the authors did not mention anything about the family
R = {Rm}m∈M that is involved in the Definition 1.1 of Berge equilibrium. This means that the existence of the Berge
equilibrium is established for all Berge equilibria that the Definition 1.1 encompasses, provided that the assumptions
of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied.
4. The assumptions of the Abalo and Kostreva theorem are not sufficient: A counterexample, analysis and
correction
In this section, we give a counterexample for Theorem 3.1.
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4.1. A counterexample for Theorem 3.1
Assume that in game (1.1) n = 3 and I = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose that X i = [0, 1], for each i = 1, 2, 3 and
x = (x1, x2, x3);
f1(x) = x1 + x2 + x3,
f2(x) = x1 + x2 − x3,
f3(x) = x1 − x2 + x3.
Let us consider the following family S: S1 = {2, 3}, S2 = {1, 3}, S3 = {1, 2}. We have I = ⋃i∈I Si . Thus, according
to Definitions 1.1 and 1.2, the Berge equilibria in the sense of Abalo and Kostreva for this game with these two families
are Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii.
(1) Let us prove that S = {Si }i=1,2,3 is an S-system for this game. It is obvious that S is a family of pairwise distinct
subsets of I and I = ⋃i∈I Si . It remains to prove that for each i ∈ I and for each x I−Si , argmaxi (x I−Si ) is
nonempty, where
argmax
i
(x I−Si ) = {x Si ∈ XSi : fi (x Si , x I−Si ) = max
ySi ∈XSi
fi (ySi , x I−Si )}.
• i = 1: then I − S1 = {1} and x I−S1 = x1.
f1(x1, y2, y3) = x1 + y2 + y3 ≤ x1 + 2; thus argmax1(x I−S1) = {(1, 1)}.
• i = 2: then I − S2 = {2} and x I−S2 = x2.
f2(y1, x2, y3) = y1 + x2 − y3 ≤ x2 + 1; thus argmax2(x I−S2) = {(1, 0)}.
• i = 3: then I − S3 = {3} and x I−S3 = x3.
f3(y1, y2, x3) = y1 − y2 + x3 ≤ x3 + 1; thus argmax3(x I−S1) = {(1, 0)}.
Since for each i ∈ I , argmaxi (x I−Si ) is a singleton, then S is an S-system of game G.
(2) fi is continuous on X , and X i is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of R.
We conclude that all conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied. Then, the game considered has a Berge equilibrium
in the sense of Abalo and Kostreva that is also a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii, for we have chosen
M = I , Ri = {i}, and Si = I − i for all i ∈ I , i.e., the system (1.2) has a solution.
From Proposition 2.1 we deduce that
µ = min
x∈X maxŷ∈X̂
φ(x, ŷ) = 0. (4.1)
On the other hand, we have
max
yI−1
f1(x1, yI−1)− f1(x) = 2− x2 − x3, ∀x ∈ X.
max
yI−2
f2(x2, yI−2)− f2(x) = 1− x1 + x3, ∀x ∈ X.
max
yI−3
f3(x3, yI−3)− f3(x) = 1− x1 + x2, ∀x ∈ X.
Then, we obtain
µ = min
x∈X maxŷ∈X̂
φ(x, ŷ) = min
x∈X
[
3∑
i=1
(max
yI−i
fi (xi , ŷI−i )− fi (x))
]
= min
x∈X(4− 2x1) = 4+ 2 minx1∈X1(−x1).
Since minx1∈X1(−x1) = −1, then µ = minx∈X maxŷ∈X̂ φ(x, ŷ) = 2 > 0.
Since µ > 0, then according to Proposition 2.1, the game considered has no Berge equilibrium in the sense of
Zhukovskii. This contradicts the conclusion of Theorem 3.1.
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4.2. Analysis and correction
Let us now find out exactly where the flaw in Theorem 3.1 is, using our example. We first build the function
h(.) given in the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [1,2]. Let S′ = {S′i }i∈I = {{2}, {3}, {1}} and define the function g(.)
by g(i) = i + 1 for i = 1, 2 and g(3) = 1. Hence h(u) = Πg(i)∈IProjXg(i) argmaxi (u I−Si ) = (1, 1, 0) (see the
calculation of argmaxi (u I−Si ) above); this means that the function h(.) is constant, and hence x = (1, 1, 0) is a fixed
point of h(.), but it is not a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii. Indeed, for example for the first player,
argmaxyI−1∈X I−1 f1(x1, yI−1) = {(1, 1)} 6= x I−1 = {(1, 0)}.
In general, in Theorem 3.1 for a fixed point x of function h(.), xSi is not necessarily equal to argmaxi (x I−Si ).
Thus, the problem in Theorem 3.1 is that the condition 2 is not sufficient for the existence of a Berge equilibrium. In
fact, in [1,2,7] it has not been proven that a fixed point of the function h(.), constructed in the proofs of the theorems
concerned, is a Berge equilibrium of the game (1.1).
Let us now explain the problem in the general case. We first introduce some notation. For each player i and
x I−Si ∈ X I−Si , denote by ySi (x I−Si ) the singleton of argmaxi (x I−Si ), i.e. argmaxi (x I−Si ) = ySi (x I−Si ), and for
each z ∈ X , for each subset S of I and j ∈ S, ProjX j zS = z jS ; it is easy to see that ProjX j zS = z jS = z j .
Now assume that u is a fixed point of function h(.). This means that u = h(u) = Πg(i)∈IProjXg(i) argmaxi (ySi (u I−Si ))
= Πg(i)∈IProjXg(i) ySi (u I−Si ) = Πg(i)∈I yg(i)Si (u I−Si ), i.e. u = Πg(i)∈I y
g(i)
Si
(u I−Si ); hence,
∀i ∈ I, ui = yiSg−1( j)(u I−Sg−1( j)), where i = g( j). (4.2)
Hence, for each i ∈ I ,
uSi = Π j∈Si y jSg−1( j)(u I−Sg−1( j)). (4.3)
On the other hand, by Definition 1.1 the strategy profile u is a Berge equilibrium if for each i ∈ I , {uSi } =
argmaxi (u I−Si ) = {ySi (u I−Si )}. This means that for u to be a Berge equilibrium it is necessary (and also sufficient)
that for each i ∈ I ,
uSi = ySi (u I−Si ). (4.4)
Then using (4.3) and (4.4), for each i ∈ I , we get
ySi (u I−Si ) = Π j∈Si y jSg−1 ( j)(u I−Sg−1( j)). (4.5)
This condition is not guaranteed by assumption 2 of Theorem 3.1. Indeed, there is no indication about any relation
between ySi (x I−Si ) and ySp (x I−Sp ) for any x ∈ X and any i, p ∈ I , with i 6= p. This fact is illustrated in the
counterexample. From this analysis, we deduce that if condition 2 of Theorem 3.1 is replaced by the following:
∀x ∈ X, ∃y ∈ X such that argmax
i
(x I−Si ) = {ySi }, for each i ∈ I,
then the theorem will be true. Thus, Theorem 3.1 can be reformulated correctly as follows.
Theorem 4.1. Let I be an indexed set, finite or infinite. Let {Ei }i∈I be a family of metrizable locally convex topological
vector spaces. Let the set S = {Si }i∈I be an S-system for game (1.1) and for each i ∈ I , let X i be a nonempty convex
and weakly compact subset of Ei such that
(1) fi is continuous on X,
(2) ∀x ∈ X, ∃y ∈ X such that argmaxi (x I−Si ) = {ySi }, for each i ∈ I .
Then game (1.1) has a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Abalo and Kostreva.
Proof. The fact that function h(.) has a fixed point is proved in [1,2]. It remains to prove that a fixed point u of h(.) is
actually a Berge equilibrium of game (1.1). Let u be a fixed point of h(.). According to assumption 2 of Theorem 4.1,
there exists z ∈ X such that
argmax
i
(u I−Si ) = {zSi }, for each i ∈ I.
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Then from (4.3) we deduce that for each i ∈ I ,
uSi = Π j∈Si z jSg−1( j) . (4.6)
Since z ∈ X , we have z jSg−1( j) = ProjX j z = z j , for each j ∈ Si . Then for each i ∈ I , we have
uSi = zSi . (4.7)
Hence, using (4.6) and (4.7), we conclude that uSi = argmaxi (u I−Si ), for each i ∈ I . This means that u is a Berge
equilibrium of the game (1.1). 
Remark 4.1. The assumption 2 in Theorem 4.1 implies the assumption 2 of Theorem 3.1. The converse is not true
in general. It is to be noted that the examples provided in [2] to illustrate Theorem 3.1 verify the condition 2 of
Theorem 4.1 which is why a Berge equilibrium exists for these examples, not because condition 2 of Theorem 3.1 is
verified.
Remark 4.2. Since an S-system is also an (S, R,M)-system, then the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, that appear in [2],
are not sufficient for the existence of the Berge equilibrium as well. We think that the other similar results that are
provided in Theorems 2–5 and Corollary 3 [1], Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 [2], Theorems 2 and 3 [3], and Theorems 3.2–3.5
[4] should be reviewed using our analysis for the same arguments, and assumptions similar to those in Theorem 3.1
are used to establish the existence of Berge equilibria [2]. On the basis of the same analysis we conclude that the
assumptions of Radjef’s theorem [7], which is the basic reference of Theorem 3.1 [2], are also not sufficient for the
existence of the Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we have shown that the assumptions of the Berge equilibrium existence Theorem 3.1 that appeared
in [1,2] are actually not sufficient. We proposed a condition that overcomes the difficulty in this theorem. In fact the
original mistake is in the paper [7]. Since many papers use this paper as the basic reference, as in [1,2], we felt that the
present note was necessary to avoid more publications based on it. Actually, the problem of the existence of a Berge
equilibrium is far more difficult than the problem of the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We hope that this work will
draw the attention of more researchers to solving the challenging problem of the existence of a Berge equilibrium.
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